Hand Me My Body Back

Every flight starts with the standard three-minute safety demonstration, complete with seatbelt and life vest props. During the demonstration, flight attendants inform passengers that in the event of a sudden decrease in air cabin pressure, oxygen masks will drop from the ceiling. Flight attendants explicitly instruct passengers to put their own oxygen masks on first, prior to assisting others. These safety instructions provide an important lesson for all individuals in helping professions: in order to help others, you need to take care of yourself first.

The Cost of Compassion

Instinctually we as humans have a desire to help others. Those deeds often come at the cost of our own lives. We join hands with others in the fight against evil or injustice. We lend a helping hand to those we feel need it in the time of a crisis. We walk hand and hand together to reach a common goal. We adopt their issues as if they were our own.

But what happens when the hands you are holding begin to poison your body? Don’t ask me. Ask what would Jesus do ( WWJD)!

Matthew 18:8-10

“If your hand or your foot causes you to stumble, cut it off and throw it away. It is better for you to enter life maimed or crippled than to have two hands or two feet and be thrown into eternal fire. And if your eye causes you to stumble, gouge it out and throw it away.”

The Cost of Compassion

Instinctually we as humans have a desire to help others. Those deeds often come at the cost of our own lives. We join hands with others in the fight against evil or injustice. We lend a helping hand to those we feel need it in the time of a crisis. We walk hand and hand together to reach a common goal. We adopt their issues as if they were our own.

But what happens when the hands you are holding begin to poison your body? Don’t ask me. Ask what would Jesus do ( WWJD)!

Matthew 18:8-10

“If your hand or your foot causes you to stumble, cut it off and throw it away. It is better for you to enter life maimed or crippled than to have two hands or two feet and be thrown into eternal fire. And if your eye causes you to stumble, gouge it out and throw it away.”

TSLA is America’s Camry

Tesla’s annual “Impact Report,” released in May, surveyed thousands of its “key stakeholders.” Most were in China. Tesla’s largest plant and export hub is in Shanghai. It has just opened a research-and-development center there as well. Founded in America, dependent on American innovation, nurtured by American subsidies, the world’s most valuable car company might best be described as Chinese. When its executives promise “stakeholder engagement,” they mean kowtowing.

Faced with such results, policy-makers and their economists are belatedly discovering that globalization is not a “no-brainer,” an easy “win-win,” or even a particularly good idea. Researchers have shown that free trade with China cost America millions of jobs, with consequences ranging from declining family formation to increasing substance abuse and suicide — the so-called deaths of despair. The Covid-19 pandemic’s disruptions have exposed the strategic disaster of dependence on China, the costs of moving supply chains overseas, and the ways that the single-minded pursuit of efficiency can make a nation less resilient.

The economic-policy tools that conservatives most comfortably wield — tax reform, deregulation, expanding trade, and so forth — were chosen long ago in response to different challenges. They offer little help here. So policy-makers have begun rummaging through the garage to make a bigger toolbox. In the semiconductor industry, for instance, Taiwan and South Korea supplanted U.S. leadership through an aggressive industrial policy of direct public investments and subsidies for their own chip manufacturers. China is now attempting the same. In America, the recently passed CHIPS and Science Act represents the beginning of a response, with funds aimed at supporting both construction of chip-fabrication plants here and research that could produce future breakthroughs.

But conservatives rightly prize America’s market economy and worry that subsidies will fuel cronyism and mis-allocate capital. Subsidies for particular firms and projects are a double-edged sword: Their narrow targeting might seem to minimize market intervention, but they also leave room for mischief. The CHIPS Act is better than the alternative of simply abandoning technological leadership to Asia, but the conservative toolbox has more to offer. Much blunter instruments can often get more done and, counterintuitively, they can do much less damage to markets in the process.

TSLA is America’s Camry

Tesla’s annual “Impact Report,” released in May, surveyed thousands of its “key stakeholders.” Most were in China. Tesla’s largest plant and export hub is in Shanghai. It has just opened a research-and-development center there as well. Founded in America, dependent on American innovation, nurtured by American subsidies, the world’s most valuable car company might best be described as Chinese. When its executives promise “stakeholder engagement,” they mean kowtowing.

Faced with such results, policy-makers and their economists are belatedly discovering that globalization is not a “no-brainer,” an easy “win-win,” or even a particularly good idea. Researchers have shown that free trade with China cost America millions of jobs, with consequences ranging from declining family formation to increasing substance abuse and suicide — the so-called deaths of despair. The Covid-19 pandemic’s disruptions have exposed the strategic disaster of dependence on China, the costs of moving supply chains overseas, and the ways that the single-minded pursuit of efficiency can make a nation less resilient.

The economic-policy tools that conservatives most comfortably wield — tax reform, deregulation, expanding trade, and so forth — were chosen long ago in response to different challenges. They offer little help here. So policy-makers have begun rummaging through the garage to make a bigger toolbox. In the semiconductor industry, for instance, Taiwan and South Korea supplanted U.S. leadership through an aggressive industrial policy of direct public investments and subsidies for their own chip manufacturers. China is now attempting the same. In America, the recently passed CHIPS and Science Act represents the beginning of a response, with funds aimed at supporting both construction of chip-fabrication plants here and research that could produce future breakthroughs.

But conservatives rightly prize America’s market economy and worry that subsidies will fuel cronyism and mis-allocate capital. Subsidies for particular firms and projects are a double-edged sword: Their narrow targeting might seem to minimize market intervention, but they also leave room for mischief. The CHIPS Act is better than the alternative of simply abandoning technological leadership to Asia, but the conservative toolbox has more to offer. Much blunter instruments can often get more done and, counterintuitively, they can do much less damage to markets in the process.

The Power of Blunt Economic Tools

The best illustration comes from our own shores, during the presidency of Ronald Reagan. When he took office, the domestic auto industry was in a tailspin. Facing a flood of Japanese imports, the “Big Three” automakers — GM, Ford, and Chrysler — had just suffered their first losses in more than two decades and collectively laid off a tenth of their factory workers. While some in his cabinet advised doing nothing, Reagan negotiated an import quota with Japan, sharply constricting the flow of vehicles into the United States. This was not a subtle or fine-tuned policy; it simply prohibited imports from rising above the 1979 level.

And it worked. Detroit turned around, and the Japanese firms invested tens of billions of dollars in a massive new manufacturing base in the South that created hundreds of thousands of American jobs — the single, exceptional example of significant foreign manufacturing capacity relocating to America instead of the other way around. Anyone hoping for more of the same today should take note.

In 1980, Japanese automakers were trouncing Detroit’s “Big Three” in the American car market. After decades of intensive state support, Japanese firms had developed the world’s most efficient production processes and made the highest-quality cars. Without the time and resources to retool, American automakers risked bankruptcy and mass layoffs. President Ronald Reagan negotiated a quota on Japanese imports that stemmed competition for four years, bought Detroit time to retool, and spurred massive foreign investment in a new manufacturing base in the South that created hundreds of thousands of American jobs.

Small, fuel-efficient cars were a Japanese specialty and the American automakers, unable to quickly retool, quickly lost ground. Japanese automakers reached 21% market share in 1980, at which point they were exporting nearly two million cars annually to the U.S.—more than they were selling in their home market. That year, the Big Three American automakers suffered a $6.2 billion loss, after an average of $4.4 billion in annual profits during the previous decade. In the span of two years, Big Three sales had plummeted 30%, to their lowest level since 1961. Chrysler was on the verge of bankruptcy, and over 100,000 auto factory workers had been laid off.

Backed by the threat of an outright import quota, President Reagan negotiated a “voluntary export restraint” (VER) with Japan’s Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI). Japan agreed to limit its auto exports to the United States to 1.68 million, the level from 1979, for three years beginning in 1981. It was the economic equivalent of an import quota.

In the near term, the quota reduced the sales of Japanese cars by 20% and raised prices for consumers by an average of 8%, costing American consumers an additional $5.1 billion. But within the decade it had prompted nearly three times that much in foreign direct investment and brought 26,600 new auto-assembly jobs to the American South and Midwest. The investment in assembly plants spurred Japanese automakers to onshore more of their value chains, including component manufacturing and materials, which created 101,700 American jobs by 1991 (American Compass, 2023).

The Power of Blunt Economic Tools

The best illustration comes from our own shores, during the presidency of Ronald Reagan. When he took office, the domestic auto industry was in a tailspin. Facing a flood of Japanese imports, the “Big Three” automakers — GM, Ford, and Chrysler — had just suffered their first losses in more than two decades and collectively laid off a tenth of their factory workers. While some in his cabinet advised doing nothing, Reagan negotiated an import quota with Japan, sharply constricting the flow of vehicles into the United States. This was not a subtle or fine-tuned policy; it simply prohibited imports from rising above the 1979 level.

And it worked. Detroit turned around, and the Japanese firms invested tens of billions of dollars in a massive new manufacturing base in the South that created hundreds of thousands of American jobs — the single, exceptional example of significant foreign manufacturing capacity relocating to America instead of the other way around. Anyone hoping for more of the same today should take note.

In 1980, Japanese automakers were trouncing Detroit’s “Big Three” in the American car market. After decades of intensive state support, Japanese firms had developed the world’s most efficient production processes and made the highest-quality cars. Without the time and resources to retool, American automakers risked bankruptcy and mass layoffs. President Ronald Reagan negotiated a quota on Japanese imports that stemmed competition for four years, bought Detroit time to retool, and spurred massive foreign investment in a new manufacturing base in the South that created hundreds of thousands of American jobs.

Small, fuel-efficient cars were a Japanese specialty and the American automakers, unable to quickly retool, quickly lost ground. Japanese automakers reached 21% market share in 1980, at which point they were exporting nearly two million cars annually to the U.S.—more than they were selling in their home market. That year, the Big Three American automakers suffered a $6.2 billion loss, after an average of $4.4 billion in annual profits during the previous decade. In the span of two years, Big Three sales had plummeted 30%, to their lowest level since 1961. Chrysler was on the verge of bankruptcy, and over 100,000 auto factory workers had been laid off.

Backed by the threat of an outright import quota, President Reagan negotiated a “voluntary export restraint” (VER) with Japan’s Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI). Japan agreed to limit its auto exports to the United States to 1.68 million, the level from 1979, for three years beginning in 1981. It was the economic equivalent of an import quota.

In the near term, the quota reduced the sales of Japanese cars by 20% and raised prices for consumers by an average of 8%, costing American consumers an additional $5.1 billion. But within the decade it had prompted nearly three times that much in foreign direct investment and brought 26,600 new auto-assembly jobs to the American South and Midwest. The investment in assembly plants spurred Japanese automakers to onshore more of their value chains, including component manufacturing and materials, which created 101,700 American jobs by 1991 (American Compass, 2023).

Globalization’s Uneven Exchange

President Donald Trump was reelected on a promise to rebuild domestic industry, defend American producers and workers, and rebalance U.S. trade. To achieve these objectives, the president and policymakers in Congress should pursue a robust trade agenda that expands the use of tariffs.

After decades of high-quality jobs and manufacturing moving overseas, Americans recognize that today’s trade regime does not deliver the widely shared benefits that its advocates promise. A survey published by American Compass last year found that 47 percent of Americans feel the nation has “suffered” from globalization compared with only 33 percent feeling it has benefited. The respondents also agreed that “we need a stronger manufacturing sector” by a margin of ten to one.

For most of the 20th century, the United States was the world’s dominant manufacturer and innovator. But starting in the mid-1970s, the U.S. began to run a trade deficit. This deficit accelerated after the formation of the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 1994, rising from a recent low of $28.6 billion in 1991 to $377 billion in 2001. After China was admitted to the WTO that year, the U.S. trade deficit continued to skyrocket, reaching 918.4 billion in 2024. This represents 78 percent of trade deficits worldwide.

Why is Tesla America’s Camry? Why does Trump Support Elon Musk? Why would President Trump put tariffs on Europe as a global Ally? Why is this relationship important to saving America’s Manufacturing Sector?

Chinese electric vehicle maker BYD plans to double its overseas sales this year as it steps up competition with Elon Musk’s Tesla and other automakers, a top executive said Tuesday.

BYD Chairman Wang Chuanfu said that the company projects selling more than 800,000 vehicles outside China – up from 417,204 sold overseas in 2024.

Car buyers in Britain are “very open” to vehicles sold by BYD and other Chinese competitors, according to Wang, who said he expects a “substantial rise” in sales. The chairman also cited “great opportunities” in certain countries in Latina America and Southeast Asia that maintain friendly trade relations with China.

BYD’s product lineup includes a mix of fully electric vehicles and hybrids – the cheapest of which is available for less than $10,000. The company expects to sell 5.5 million vehicles this year.

The Chinese car maker is building manufacturing plants in Brazil, Turkey, Thailand and Hungary as part of its overseas expansion.

The international plans could spell trouble for Tesla, which had China and other international markets to drive growth in recent years. Musk’s firm has recently dealt with a sales slowdown in China, due in part to rising competition from Chinese EV rivals that has fueled a price war in the country.

Tesla’s global car deliveries sank year-over-year for the first time in 2024.

Earlier this week, BYD reported annual sales of $107 billion – outpacing Tesla’s $97.7 billion in revenue over the same period. BYD further shook up the EV market earlier this month by unveiling a charging system that allows its latest models to go 250 miles on a charge of just five minutes.

BYD does not sell its vehicles in the US or Canada – both of which impose massive 100% tariffs on Chinese-made electric vehicles. Since taking office, Trump has imposed an additional 20% tariffs on Chinese imports – and warned of further action if a deal on trade terms isn’t struck.

Meanwhile, Wang said BYD has no immediate plans to sell its cars in the US and Canada and reportedly cited geopolitical tensions.